This document chronicles the information we have been able to obtain regarding reactions to date from the White House as well as the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency and the nuclear industry.

1.    The White House

• President Clinton included a statement on the JCO accident in his White House press briefing on Thursday, September 30.  In response to a question on how the United States would help, Clinton said:

  We are doing our best to determine what, in fact, has happened and what assistance we can give.  And we will do whatever we possibly can that will be helpful to them.  And we will try to be as comprehensive and prompt about it as possible.

• On Friday October 1, 1999, President Clinton stated, in response to a question by a reporter about steps that may be taken to ensure a similar accident could not occur in the United States, that:

  [I have] asked...the appropriate authorities to take a look at that...We ought to have all of our people learn everything we could about what happened [in Japan], analyze our systems here, and make sure we've done everything we can to protect ourselves...

  Clinton also said that the JCO accident "should again sensitize us to the importance of issues of nuclear safety," and took the opportunity to comment on the siting of the Yucca Mountain repository.  Noting that he is "in a dispute with a majority of members of Congress" over Yucca Mountain, Clinton stated that when the site was selected, "there was some science in there, but perhaps some politics, too, since Nevada is a small state and I have wanted not to see this issue politicized but to bend over backwards to make sure we do everything we can to deal with the nuclear safety issue before we adopt this course.  I still feel that way."

• In a written statement on October 1, 1999 explaining the President's intention to veto the current Senate bill on Yucca Mountain, President Clinton said:

  Yesterday's nuclear accident in Japan is a tragic reminder that we must do everything in our power to ensure safe, responsible handling of radioactive materials.

• Clinton reportedly ordered the Department of Energy to conduct a safety review of nuclear fuel processing, and ordered officials from DOE, NRC and the National Security Council to meet on Tuesday October 5, 1999 to develop a response to the incident.

2.    U.S. Department of Energy

• DOE issued their nuclear criticality safety review on May 11, 2000 (click here to view the report or here to read the report summary in the press release).  DOE's study focused on criticality safety activities at five facilities:

  • Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico;
    
  • Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, Colorado;
    
  • Hanford Site, Washington;
    
  • Savannah River Site, South Carolina; and
    
  • Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Tennessee.

  The report found that the conditions that led to the JCO accident do not exist in the United States due to the procedures and standards adopted in the United States.  However, the report recommended a series of further actions, including a revision of DOE orders for consistency and action to ensure that all guidance is understood, adhered to and constantly improved.  The prescribed actions include:

  • Creating corrective action plans for each site to implement report guidance;
    
  • Increasing rewards and incentives for DOE to retain and reward criticality safety specialists;
    
  • Finalizing job certification standards and training for criticality safety specialists within the next 30 days;
    
  • Hiring more criticality safety specialists and ensuring all criticality staff meet DOE standards;
    
  • Increasing and tracking hours criticality staff spend on duty, observing criticality work.

  Secretary Richardson will send a team to return to each of the five sites in January 2001 to ensure that the above work has been completed satisfactorily.

• DOE sent a delegation of nuclear experts to Japan to exchange information on the JCO accident from October 18-19, 1999 (view the DOE Press Release here).  They did not visit the site of the accident due to concerns about residual radioactivity, but were to meet and exchange information with officials from the Japan Science and Technology Agency (STA) in Tokyo, the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI), the Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) and the JCO Company.  The team members were:

  1. Mr. Frank McCoy, deputy manager of the Energy Department's Savannah River Operations Office, team leader.
     
  2. Dr. Leroy Lewis, chemist with the DOE's Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory.
     
  3. Dr. Thomas P. McLaughlin, the Group Leader of the Criticality Safety Group at DOE's Los Alamos National Laboratory.

• On October 22, 1999 the DOE team gave a press conference to discuss their trip.  They commented that all meetings were cooperative and informative.  The team stated that JCO employees had performed an operation outside of their licensed authority that was further complicated by the operation being performed in an incorrect manner.  They cited insufficient training and a mechanical system that was not "user friendly" as additional factors.  Questioned on whether a similar accident could occur in the U.S., the team responded that similar accidents have already occurred (although not in some time) and could indeed occur again.  However, they stated that lessons have been learned from previous accidents, and that the JCO accident, while unfortunate, will reinforce diligence.

3.    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• The NRC staff presented to the Commissioners the findings of the NRC investigation into the JCO criticality accident and its impacts on the United States at a meeting on May 8, 2000.  The NRC found that the cause of the accident was inadequate regulatory oversight, the lack of an appropriate safety culture, and inadequate worker training and qualification.

  The NRC briefing highlighted key differences between Japanese and U.S. regulatory requirements for criticality safety:

  
  
  • In licensing the JCO facility, Japanese regulators assumed that criticality was impossible. NRC assumes that criticality is possible at such facilities and requires a risk evaluation.
    
  • The JCO facility had no alarm system and no emergency plan for any criticality accident. NRC requires commercial U.S. facilities to maintain both.
    
  • Operator training on criticality safety was not required and therefore not performed at JCO. NRC requires such training at all licensed fuel cycle facilities.
    
  • Japanese regulators did not review authorization procedures for management control of the startup of JCO facility operations. NRC requires and inspects for compliance with such procedures in licensed fuel cycle facilities.
    
  • There was no regulatory review of the safety culture at the JCO site. NRC evaluates safety culture issues routinely as part of licensee performance reviews.
    
  • NRC inspects licensed U.S. fuel fabrication and enrichment facilities routinely. Until the accident, JCO had not been inspected by Japanese regulators since 1992.

• On Friday, January 7, 2000, Takio Kano, a member of the Japanese Diet, met with NRC Commissioners Greta Dicus and Frank McGaffigan.  According to the weekly NRC Information Report the meeting was held to discuss the JCO accident and to "hear from the NRC what it means to be an 'independent' regulatory body."

• Numark Associates interviewed Dr. Carl Paperiello, then Director of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) of the NRC, on October 4, 1999 about NRC's response to the JCO accident.  He said he spoke with NRC inspectors for fuel processing plants to communicate his concerns.  He also issued a Temporary Instruction (TI) to all NRC inspectors, putting them on heightened alert.  NMSS reviewed all recent inspection reports to look for any indications of anomalous procedures or systematic under-training at NRC-licensed facilities.  Paparello also said he would issue an Information Notice on the accident to all licensees shortly.

• NRC issued a press release on October 8, 1999 providing further details on their response to the JCO accident, available here.

• On November 17, 1999, NRC issued an Information Notice (click here to view) to all licensees on the JCO accident on November 17, 1999.  The Information Notice gives some information about the accident, details specific NRC actions in response and identifies six areas in which licensees are encouraged to review policies and procedures.

• Note that NRC deploys its inspectors as follows at fuel processing facilities:

  • USEC's Paducah and Portsmouth uranium enrichment facilities: two resident inspectors each,
    
  • NFS and BWX naval fuel fabrication facilities: one resident inspector each,
    
  • GE, Westinghouse, Combustion Engineering, Siemens and Framatome Cogema Fuels commercial fuel fabrication facilities: no resident inspectors - regional inspectors carry out the inspections.

4.    Environmental Protection Agency

• The West Coast monitors of the Environmental Protection Agency's Environmental Radiation Monitoring System (ERMS), were put on alert on Friday, October 1, 1999, at the order of the DOE Emergency Operations Center, in response to the JCO accident.  An ERMS alert entails increasing the frequency of checking the samples, from the usual twice a week to daily.  EPA then checks its sampling results against projections received from DOE, NRC and NOAA about the reported release.  EPA's ERMS system also works closely with the Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.  ARAC routinely tracks atmospheric releases for DOE and reportedly has also monitored for radiation releases from the JCO accident.

5.    Nuclear Industry

• On October 4, 1999 the Nuclear Energy Institute organized a meeting in Washington among U.S. nuclear fuel fabricators to learn and apply lessons from the JCO accident.  At that meeting, industry formed a working group to inspect each of the U.S. fabrication and enrichment facilities, in addition to the Allied Signal uranium conversion plant, looking at criticality safety (though not at Allied Signal) and emergency response.  The team issued its report at the above mentioned NRC Commission meeting on May 8, 2000. The results of that report will be available from the NEI website.

• At the November 15, 1999 ANS Special Session on the JCO Accident, Dr. Francis Alcorn of the BWX Naval Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Facility stated that BWX responded to the accident by instituting the following:
  
  
  1. Daily briefings of criticality and operations staff;
     
  2. Special safety alerts reminding staff to strictly adhere to established procedures;
     
  3. Video and other special training for chemical operators, reminding them that "it could happen here;"
     
  4. Formation of a special task force to examine training, material transfers, the availability of large vessels at the plant, and enrichment controls; and
     
  5. Emergency preparedness reviews.

Dr. Alcorn also stated that BWX prohibits all large-geometry vessels on site, drilling holes in all garbage pails, trashcans and even desk drawers to prevent potential unauthorized use.